What does Descartes mean by �clear and distinct� ideas?Is it acceptable as a truth rule? |
Can Descartes� epistemology � in relying on the veracity of God � be defended against the charge of circularity?What, if anything, can an atheist know? |
what is Descartes trying to do with the notion of clear and distinct?
establish a general truth criterion
define clear and distinct
intuition and deduction
with reference to the natural light
can we have doubt without certainty?
yes-ish
ED + MCD
There is argument over where the clear and distint rule comes from. In the text, it seems simply as though Descartes has induced the principle by looking at the only example he has of which he is certain, the Cogito. From this sole instance, he tries to distil what it is which makes the Cogito immediately intuitable, self-evidenced and incorrigible � in short, irresistible. He decides that it is the clarity and distinctiveness with which he perceives it, and from this, he can generalise to a rule which states that all similarly clear and distinct perceptions deserve an equal level of certainty. But when he is searching for what it is that gives the Cogito its irresistibility, he seems to be mistaking its clarity and distinctiveness for another, rarer property � self-verifiability. �By doubting that I am thinking, I am thinking� � with this, he intuits (in the Cartesian technical sense) his own existence, in an indubitable but time-bound proposition. He now needs some means of turning this into a stable, on-going belief with the minimum possible risk of error. So when Descartes seizes upon the clarity and distinctiveness of the Cogito, he is affirming it as a suitable acceptance rule. If this were the case, it would leave our vital, crucial acceptance rule very open to claims of being chosen for expedience rather than justification. We shall see that this attack loses its force when it is seen as simply the weaker form of the rule, where clarity and distinctiveness serves as a criterion for certainty without any grounding in truth.
But let us first consider Feldman�s interpretation of how our certainty of these starting premises might differ as the enquiry proceeds. These starting premises are �practically� certain. This is similar to Gewirth�s earlier notion of �psychological� certainty, but practical certainty is based on justification than irresistibility. The important thing is that they are intuitable, that we can have subjective certainty of them and that we cannot simultaneously have certainty of their negation (which Descartes takes as an axiom). Most normal beliefs have practical certainty.
From these starting premises, the enquirer can achieve psychological certainty of the proofs of God. The Cartesian circle is thus broken by upgrading to metaphysical certainty when God is there to guarantee it. In this way, the level of certainty before knowing there is a God who is no deceiver is less than the level of certainty afterwards, and the epistemic weight is only distributed in one direction of the arc. Unfortunately, Van Cleve demonstrates the inadequacy of this supposedly objective metaphysical certainty by showing that it amounts to no more than psychological certainty of the propositions, as well as psychological certainty of the falsehood of every reason for doubting them. Hopes of having a qualitatively firmer kind of certainty are dashed.
This is where Van Cleve extricates the clear and distinct rule from an ambiguity.
first we had certainty
now, paralleling Williams� approach, having proved God, we can view this certainty as equivalent to truth
it is beginning to seem as though both Bernard Williams� and Van Cleve�s bi-partite distinciotn is going to cleave the problematic definition of �clear and distinct� in half
though deduction fits less clearly � in a way, Descartes is saying that we can clearly and distinctively perceive the validity/inferences of the arg, as well as the the premises
2 kinds of doubt (particular/systematic or specific/uncertain) to match the 2 kinds of
certainty
psychological/practical + metaphysical certainty
so at this stage of our attempt to formulate a non-circular justification and implementation of the clear and distinct rule from a perspective outside the Meditations, clear and distinct is the most/only sensible choice for an acceptance rule
but this would never keep the critics at bay
it�s too arbitrary � or at least might not be true, just because it fits
we know that we�ve been discussing the first half of a dstinction of the ambiguous English sentence �I know what I perceive clearly and distinctively to be true�
where a clear and distinct perception of a proposition (P) correlates to certainty regarding that proposition
but we have no link to anchor our subjective certainty to truth
Frankfurt may have argued that this is not Descartes�s ultimate aim: instead, Descartes would be happy living on an island, a set of consistent propositions, which float around without being moored to an absolute conception of truth
but if we did want to try and ground ourselves, how could we?
well, we have some first principles of which we�re certain (consisting of the Cogito and the causal principles etc.)
from which we can feel certain of a benevolent God�s existence
these beliefs are consistent with each other for sure, but note that no mention of their truth with reference to an absolute objective conception of reality has been made
until now, when we can do this, finally resting our
we have a set of consistent beliefs of which we are certain � one of them amounts to saying that all beliefs of which we are certain is true � (it�s like predicating existence) it�s true if it�s true but if it�s not it�s not
Can we even see things with the necessary clarity & distinctiveness? After all, perhaps the Cogito was clear and distinct just because it was self-verifiable. Well, Descartes� failure has left modern philosophy with an unhappy lingering doubt that we cannot succeed in proceeding with confidence much further than the Cogito � as Williams concludes, even though the surrounding structure of the Meditations appears sound, without the proofs of God on which it all hinges, we are stranded on either side of solipsism and phenomenalism/idealism.
And even if we agree that we can occasionally, can we distinguish that total level of clarity from specious sophistry well enough to exercise our will with confidence and reliability? Even if we assume that we are seeing a proposition clearly and distinctly, Descartes himself serves as warning to those who do so mistakenly. Perhaps the reason he felt able to apply clarity and distinctiveness as a criterion as he does is because he assumes freedom of will and voluntary directed belief from the start. When we say we see something clearly, we can always see something else slightly more or less clearly � clarity is not all-or-nothing, but a continuum. Therefore, some propositions seem more eligible and others slightly less so when applying the criterion � moreover, these weightings change in the light of new facts, for we cannot hold separate beliefs in isolation. In short, although clarity and distinctiveness is a good way of clarifying the mental processes at work in gauging our certainty of a proposition, there can be no sense of having definitely apprehended something with certainty.
Descartes is climbing the epistemic
ladder, towards increasing levels of certainty.
he needs God�s existence as a vital
step otherwise an atheist could believe